INTERPERSONALSINS: FORGIVENESS VERSUS ATONEMENT

Rabbi Soloveitchik'makes the following point in Al Ha’teshuvah.

Human beings are able to grant mechilahto one another, but not kaparah. Mechilahconstitutes the act of nullifying any material obligation that the victimizerhas, either legally or morally, towards his victim. Kaparah, incontrast, constitutes the eradication of the taint of impurity that thevictimizer’s act caused to the victimizer himself. Kaparah thus neutralizes themetaphysical self-damage causes by the loss of innocence. No human being isable to affect kaparah independently, because no human being possesses thecapacity to neutralize, metaphysically the contaminating effect of thevictimizer’s behavior upon himself.

Halacha requires the victimizer tocompensate the victim for damages according to the court’s assessment of theobligation. In the case of assault and battery, for example, the fifth chapterof Bava Kama delineates five assessments that the court must determine: [1]devaluation of the body, [2] medical expenses, [3] physical pain, [4] loss ofincome, and [5] the pain of social stigma. The Mishnah then co

ntinues to instruct that, once thevictimizer has agreed to make all five payments, he must seek reconciliation bybegging forgiveness from his victim. If he is truly contrite, the victim isobligated to accept his apology and reconcile.

What does this reconciliation mean? TheMishnah does not define the act, but it does cite a poof- text, which may serveto illuminate for us the nature of the act of forgiveness.   The proof-textis from the Biblical narrative that describes Avimelech’s abduction ofAvraham’s wife, Sarah. God finally instructs Avimelech, “Return the man’swife…and he will pray for you and you will live.”  Analogously, at the end of the Book of Job,God tell Job’s friends, who have acted inappropriately towards him, that theywill obtain forgiveness when Job will pray for them. From thesesources, we may conclude that the act of forgiveness requires the victim to askGod to do for the victimizer that which only God is able to do, namely, to eradicatethe taint of sin, the contaminating impurity, from the metaphysical essence ofthe sinner.

We find an analogy to this phenomenon incontemporary secular courts, when, prior to sentencing, the court asks thevictim whether or not he desires that his victimizer receive a reducedsentence. In so doing, the court is inviting the victim to pray on behalfof the guilty party. The victim may assent to pray on the victimizer’sbehalf, because he is convinced that his victimizer has sincerely repented, andis morally a different person, a person for whom a harsh punishment would besuperfluous. Just as only the court possesses the power to reduce the sentence,only the divine court possesses the ability to purify the victimizer from hismetaphysical taint, and from whatever sanctions or consequences they may bringabout, in this world or the next.

The litmus test for reconciliation,therefore, is a willingness of the victim to pray on behalf of his now repentantvictimizer. The reason, I believe, is that Halacha desires that the two partiesalign with one another, even “against” God! The reality of alignment thusindicates true reconciliation. On a deeper level, the victim is pleading thatthe qualities of loving-kindness and mercy override the quality of justice inthe case of the victimizer.

This point harkens back to Rabbi Soloveitchik's insight appearing at the beginning of this essay. The victim, asa mere mortal, lacks the power to “forgive” in the sense of mechilah. He is notable to undo or redo the historical reality of the abuse he had suffered. He isnot able to purify his victimizer, to return him to the state of innocence. Hedoes possess the ability, however, to recognize the authentic moraltransformation on the part of his victimizer, and to acknowledge his perceptionof that transformation to God. The verb “l’ratzot” is instructive here. Themorally transformed, repentant sinner becomes desirable to the person whom, inhis earlier mode, he had hurt. This act follows prophetic paradigm, especiallyas represented by Abraham, Moses, and Jeremiah, who are willing to argueagainst God on behalf of sinful humanity. Only in Abraham’s response toAvimelech, however, the prophet petitions God for mercy on behalf of Avimelech,his own erstwhile victimizer. This becomes the model for the requirement that victimof assault be willing to reconcile with his repentant victimizer.